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The time is ripe for a new cycle of change
in the intermittent swings from regulation to
deregulation and back. In the past twenty-five
years, the United States has been through several cycles of regulation and deregulation. Although there is substantial variation among individual government agencies, regulation has
imposed substantial costs on the U.S. economy,
while deregulation has generated significant
benefits to the American public. A five-point
program of regulatory reform is needed - and
is presented in this report.
The rapid expansion of regulatory programs
through the mid-1970s was followed by an unusual spurt of deregulation. By the mid-1980s,
however, the push to deregulate had ended.
With few exceptions, the late 1980s and early
1990s have been a time of expanding regulation, especially dealing with the environment
and the workplace.
Although generalizations are always difficult
to make, there are right and wrong reasons to
regulate and good and bad ways of regulating.
Properly designed regulation can correct serious shortcomings in the marketplace that lead
to what economists call external costs. Under
the present regime of property rights, there is
limited incentive for an individual or an enterprise to protect the interests of others. Where
Murray Weidenbaum is the director of the Center
for the Study of American Business at Washington
University in St. Louis. Melinda Warren is the assistant director of the Center. This paper was prepared for presentation at the Annual Meeting of the
Economic and Allied Social Science Associations,
Washington, D.C. , January 7, 1995.

resources are free and open to everyone water and air are good examples - those refraining from polluting merely increase their
own costs without achieving direct benefits of
offsetting magnitude. This is so, even when
cleaning the air and water generates more
benefits than costs to society as a whole. This
s.ituation has been frequently cited as justificatiOn for government intervention. That does
not mean, however, that all rules designed to
deal with environmental concerns are necessarily cost-effective or even sensible. Nevertheless, the basic justification for governmental
intervention in this aspect of economic life is
clear.
In contrast, regulations that stifle competition - industry-specific rules limiting entry or
price - almost invariably cost the nation more
than the benefits derived by the groups these
rules are designed to protect. The industryspecific rules are usually labeled economic
regulation while those dealing with pollution
and other externalities are categorized as social
regulation.

The Costs of Government Regulation
Policymakers do not start out with a clean
slate. The costs of complying with existing
government regulations are very high and take
many forms. These costs include hiring additional workers to keep abreast of and to respond to government directives; purchasing
equipment to meet government health, safety,
and environmental standards; and revising production processes in response to other government requirements. Regulation also forces enterprises to change their manner of operations
- to comply with workplace directives, rules
on acceptable product characteristics, and prohibitions against a variety of activities. Be2

cause uncertainty raises business costs
(especially in the eyes of potential investors),
the frequent changes in federal, state, and local
regulations - and how they are administered
- represent a serious deterrent to new undertakings.

The costs of complying with existing
government regulations are very high
and take many forms.

The costs of government regulation are not
restricted to businesses, however. Much of the
rulemaking extends to all employers, be they
profit or non-profit, in the public sector or in
the private sector. In addition, taxpayers pay
for supporting a host of government regulators;
consumers pay higher prices to cover the added
expense of producing goods and services under
government regulation and often forego product
variety; and workers bear the burden when jobs
are eliminated as a result of the burdens im1
posed by government regulation.
Because of
the economies of scale in complying with
regulation, smaller enterprises are disproportionately affected. Regulation also diverts research and development from product creation
to "defensive R&D," those efforts that try to
assure that the product will not be rejected by
regulators. In the process, society as a whole
suffers a reduced flow of new and better products and a less rapid rise in the standard of living.
These many adverse impacts are important
but subtle. They are rarely known to the public
- unless they have first-hand experience in
dealing with government officials. A special

3

insight was provided by former senator and
presidential candidate George McGovern. He
bemoaned the government's regulatory burdens
after a failed attempt to operate a small business:
I learned by owning the Stratford Inn
that legislators and government regulators
must more carefully consider the economic
and management burdens we have been imposing on U.S. business .... I'm for protecting the health and well-being of both workers
and consumers. I'm for a clean environment
and economic justice. But I'm convinced we
can pursue these worthy goals and still cut
down vastly on the incredible paperwork, the
complicated tax forms, the number of minute
regulations, and seemingly endless reporting
requirements that afflict American business.
Many businesses, especially small independents such as the Stratford Inn, simply can't
pass such costs on to their customers and re2
main competitive or profitable.

McGovern concluded that, if he were back in
the Senate, "I would ask a lot of questions before I voted for any more burdens on the thousands of struggling businesses across the na3
tion. "
Some of the costs associated with regulatory
programs are extremely frivolous and clearly
unnecessary from the viewpoint of achieving
any serious public policy objective. Here are
just a few examples of the many absurd requirements imposed on U.S. businesses:
• A Kansas City bank was ordered by regulators to put a Braille keypad on a drive4
through ATM.
• In Boise, Idaho, a plumbing company was
penalized by the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) because
"proper" safety precautions were not taken

4

by the employees who successfully rescued
a suffocating construction worker from a
collapsed trench. The $7,875 OSHA fine
was eventually rescinded due to public
5
outrage.
• USDA has required California farmers to
dispose of millions of pounds of otherwise
good peaches and nectarines simply because they were smaller than federal standards permitted. Fruit that could have
been sold or given away to the needy had
6
to be left to rot.
• John Pozsgai, a self-employed truck mechanic in Morrisville, Pennsylvania was
fined $202,000 and sentenced to 3 years in
jail for hauling away 7,000 old tires and
rusting car parts and placing clean fill on
his own, occasionally wet, property without a federal permit. The EPA argued that
the property was a wetland because a
stream - dry for most of the year - was
partly trapped by the discarded junk and
7
created several standing pools of water.

The Direct Costs of Regulation
The historical trend of regulatory activities
can be measured by changes in the size of the
total work force of the federal regulatory
agencies (see Table 1). After rapid growth in
the decade of the 1970s (a 74 percent rise from
1970 to 1980), the regulatory wave crested. A
16 percent decline in the staffing of these activities, from 121,791 positions in 1980 to
102,192 in 1985, reflects the substantial cutbacks in the early years of President Ronald
Reagan's administration.
During the Bush
presidency, employment at federal regulatory
agencies started an upward trend that has continued into the Clinton administration. In 1993,
the regulatory headcount was an all-time high
of 129,760. 8
5

The growth in regulatory staffing is reflected in the budgets of the federal regulatory
apparatus (see Table 2). After reaching $8.8
billion (in constant 1987 dollars) in the last year
of the Carter administration, these costs were
decreased in President Reagan's first term.
Federal regulatory budgets then rose slowly
during his second term in office. President
George Bush stepped up spending on regulation
and President Bill Clinton has continued this
trend. Nearly $12 billion (in constant 1987
dollars) were spent in 1993 to fund U.S. regu. 9
1atory agencies.
Another widely used proxy used to measure
the trend of government regulation is the number of pages in the Federal Register, the publication in which regulations are listed. The size
of this publication shrunk from approximately
87,000 pages in 1980 to about 53,000 in 1988.
By 1991 , the number of pages had grown to
10
67,700.
Using any or all of these measures, government regulation in the United States is on
the upswing once again. Of course, the cost of
regulation only begins with funding and staffing
federal agencies. In several early efforts to
quantify the larger impacts, the Center for the
Study of American Business estimated that the
cost of complying with federal regulations was
11
$63 billion in 1976 and $103 billion in 1979.
Later research reveals that these costs are continuing to increase rapidly. In 1990, Rochester
Institute of Technology economist Thomas
Hopkins estimated the overall annual cost of
federal regulation at roughly $400 billion, an
12
average of $4,000 per household.
Given the absence of a comprehensive data
base on the subject, such measures are only
indicative at best. Nevertheless, there is no
evidence to suggest that the costs of complying
with regulation have declined since 1990 - or
even stabilized. A recent report from the Busi-
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ness Roundtable estimates that the nation's
regulatory system cost American businesses
and citizens $581 billion in 1993. Without reform, this yearly burden is projected to reach
13
$662 billion by the year 2000.
The costs imposed by legislation passed in
the last several years - such as the Clean Air
Act Amendments, the Americans With Disabilities Act, and the Family and Medical
Leave Act - are only beginning to show up in
these estimates of economic impact. Additional
facets of these laws await implementation that
will substantially raise the cost of doing business in the United States. For example, under
the ozone provisions of the new Clean Air Act,
the Environmental Protection Agency can prohibit new industrial facilities in areas that are
out of compliance. The loss of federal highway
grants is another threat to a region that fails to
meet these environmental regulations.
The Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)
gives new protections to people with disabilities
and requires employers to make "reasonable
accommodations" for the disabled. However,
this 1990 legislation was so poorly drafted that
many disability claims end up in court - and
this was etpected by government regulators at
the outset.
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
was portrayed as virtually costless as it wended
its way through Congress. As soon as the bill
became law, however, the public was reminded
that employers are required to maintain health
insurance coverage for employees on leave.
The General Accounting Office estimates that
15
this provision will cost $674 million a year .
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The Indirect Costs of Regulation
Most of the costs of government regulation
are not borne by taxpayers directly. However,
in large measure these expenses show up in
higher prices for the goods and services that

9

consumers buy . . These higher prices represent
the "hidden tax" of regulation, which is shifted
from government to the consumer. To the extent that government-mandated requirements
impose similar costs on all price categories of a
given product (such as catalytic converters on
automobiles), this hidden tax is more regressive
than other federal taxes such as the income tax.
That is, federal regulation often places a heavier relative burden on lower income groups
than on higher income groups.

Most of the costs of government regulation
show up in higher prices for the goods and
services that consumers buy.

Another indirect cost that needs to be considered is a reduction in the international conlpetitiveness of U.S. companies. The Clean Air
Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(Superfund) impose far more stringent regulations on manufacturing and other firms doing
business in the United States than these companies would be required to meet in other nations. The average cost of cleaning up a hazardous waste site in the United States is $30
million, far greater than the average of $1 million per site reported by businesses operating in
the Netherlands. In the United Kingdom, the
average cost ranges from $1 million to almost
16
$5 million.
These international differences are not limited to environmental programs. The pervasive
tax and regulatory obstacles placed in the way
of U.S. business - especially high-tech companies - add significantly to the cost of doing

10

business in the United States. Increasingly,
many American firms are being forced to shift
their investment patterns to foreign locations.
Some of the best-known American companies
have deployed a majority of their assets overseas - Manpower, Inc. (72%), Gillette (66%),
Mobil (63%), Digital Equipment (61 %), Exxon
(56%), Chevron (55%), Bankers Trust (52%),
17
and Citicorp (51% ).
The point being made
here should not be misunderstood; our criticism
is limited to those instances where Americanbased companies would stay in the United
States were it not for the disincentives of governmental regulation.

Benefits of Deregulation

18

An unprecedented reduction of regulation
occurred in the United States in the 1970s and
early 1980s. It was supported by an unusual
coalition of Democratic and Republican legislators, consumer advocates, and scholars in the
fields of economics, law, and political science.
However, these deregulatory efforts applied
only to economic regulation. Social regulatory
programs continued to expand.

Airline Deregulation
The passage of the Air Cargo Act of 1977
and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 virtually eliminated economic regulation of the
domestic airline industry. The primary regulatory authority over airline routes and fares, the
Civil Aeronautics Board, was abolished. It is
estimated that deregulated fares are 18 percent
lower than they would have been under regulation. The price of air travel fell (in real, inflation-adjusted terms) by more than 20 percent
from 1978 to 1991 and accident rates declined
by 48 percent during the same time period.
Due to reduced regulation, consumers enjoy an
11

annual benefit estimated in excess of $10 billion.19
Not all changes in regulatory policy have
been benign. For the crucial decade 19791989, Congress shifted the responsibility for
airline antitrust enforcement from the DepartInent of Justice to the Department of Transportation (DOT). In a misguided effort to help the
airline industry, DOT rubber-stamped every
airline merger during the 1980s, usually over
the vehement objection of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department. The result is an
unexpected high degree of market concentration in the airline industry. The share of U.S.
airline traffic held by the three largest carriers
rose from 37 percent in 1981 to 56 percent in
1992. This development undercut the basic rationale underlying economic deregulation:
competition does a better job of protecting the
consumer than regulation. A study of airline
mergers during 1985-88 reported that these
consolidations increased air fares by an average
of 9 percent relative to routes unaffected by
20
these mergers.
Another factor adversely affecting the results of deregulation is the failure of government - which owns the airports and manages
the air navigation system - to keep pace with
rising demand and to manage its functions sensibly. The result has been congestion in airports and in the sky causing delays and other
problems for the traveling public. Avoidable
congestion arises because landing fees for executive, personal, and other small aircraft are
lower than the costs such planes impose on the
air transportation system. Eliminating the subsidy of "light" airplanes by raising their fees
for using the major airports would encourage
their operators to shift to smaller, less frequently used facilities. Moreover, most aircraft
accidents involve at least one "light" (e.g., private) airplane. However, when Logan Airport

in Boston tried to raise the fees charged to
small aircraft, the pressures from the owners
and operators were so intense that the U.S. Department of Transportation forced an indefinite
delay, ostensibly so that the matter could be
"studied."
Nevertheless, on balance, the public has
achieved positive results from airline deregulation. The most compelling evidence of the
benefit of airline deregulation is the fact that
the portion of the national population that travels by air has increased very substantially.
Economists John Warner and Richard McKenzie estimate that between 1979 and 1986, airline deregulation increased air travel by an an21
nual average of 11 percent.

12

13

Competition does a better job of protecting
the consumer than regulation.

Deregulation of Surface Transportation
Substantial deregulation of surface transportation also took place in the 1980s. The Staggers Act of 1980 provided for substantial deregulation of the railroads. As a result of the
changes that companies were allowed to make
without going through the elaborate regulatory
process, railroads reduced operating costs as
well as rates to shippers. Researchers estimate
that deregulation of the rail industry saves shippers between $3 billion and $5 billion a year.
Railroad accidents have declined 70 percent
since the late 1970s. Although operating revenues have fallen, expenses have declined even
faster, making it more profitable for the rail22
roads to operate .

The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 eliminated
the barriers to entry, price discrimination, and
price fixing that had characterized the trucking
industry since the 1930s. Between 1980 and
1992, the number of carriers increased from
about 18,000 to more than 48,000. The total
number of jobs in the trucking industry rose by
about 30 percent. Savings to the economy are
estimated to be on the order of $8 billion a
year. Also, the fatal accident rate per 100 million vehicle miles shrank 40 percent between
23
1978 and 1989.
Recent decontrol of state
trucking is likely to produce additional savings.

Financial Institutions Deregulation
Banking deregulation is a more controversial area. Significant reduction in the regula-

tion of financial institutions took place in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, but substantial goverrunent involvement remains. In the 1970s,
interest rates on deposits of $100,000 and over
were deregulated. As securities firms took advantage of that "loophole," banks responded
with a new round of innovation. A process
was set in motion that has resulted in the lifting
of interest-rate ceilings of all deposits, payment
of interest on consumer-demand deposits, and
greater competition among financial institutions. However, a substantial goverrunent role
- and liability - remained, especially in deposit insurance.
In 1982, the Garn-St. Germain Depository
Institutions Act provided a wide variety of new
and expanded powers for banks and other depository institutions. The law enables banks to
establish deposit accounts competitive with
money-market funds and other mutual funds.
These new accounts carry no maximum interest
rate and modest minimum balance requirements. The changes had powerful and almost
instantaneous effects. The great majority of
personal bank accounts were moved to the
new, competitive types. A substantial (but far
from complete) shift occurred from moneymarket mutual funds to bank accounts.
The deregulation of savings and loan associations (S&Ls) in the early 1980s is frequently
cited as a cause of the thrift crisis and the ensuing S&L bailout. In retrospect, the timing of
the deregulation was most unfortunate. Eliminating interest rate ceilings and permitting
thrifts to invest in a wider range of assets was
an appropriate response to the financial risk
that accompanied wide swings in inflation and
interest rates; such deregulation enhanced the
competitive positions of the S&Ls. Unfortunately, however, the goverrunent waited until
the S&Ls were locked into low-yield long-term
mortgages and only then permitted them to pay

14
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Deregulation of the rail industry saves shippers
between $3 billion and $5 billion a year.

Until deregulation, interstate trucking was a
textbook case of how goverrunent power was
used to protect the "ins." Regulation by the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) prior
to 1980 insulated existing trucking firms and
their employees from potential competition by
making it very difficult for new trucking companies to enter the business. The redistribution
of income brought about by deregulation was to
consumers in general from the owners, managers, and employees of the regulated industry .
Moreover, the reduction of ICC regulation in
recent years has also resulted in substantial
transfers of income and wealth from the traditionally regulated portion of the industry to new
entrants.

l

J

market rates of interest for their borrowings
(usually called deposits). This combination of
forces - lending long-term at low interest rates
while borrowing short-term at high rates - was
a recipe for financial disaster·.
In 1994, Congress passed a new banking
law, the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act. When it becomes effective, this
statute will go a long way to eliminate the
McFadden Act, the basic law restricting interstate banking. The new legislation has two
major parts. The interstate banking section allows bank holding companies, beginning in the
fall of 1995, to acquire banks in other states.
This provision overrides state laws that bar outof-state institutions.
The interstate branching provisions of the
new law are more complicated. Beginning in
June 1997, banks and holding companies can
consolidate their multi-state holdings into a
single branch network. However, states can
opt out of interstate branching before the new
rules take effect by passing a law forbidding
such action. Over a period of years, the result
of the 1994 statute is likely to be fewer independent banks, more branch offices, and
24
greater diversification of banking risk.
Despite the reduction in economic regulation, Congress has not relented in increasing
social regulations imposed on financial institutions. Examples in force include the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, the
Fair Credit Billing Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Consumer Leasing Act, the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act, and the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).
The
1994 Banking Law contains significant new
"community reinvestment" provisions, prohibiting out-of-state banks from using interstate
branches "primarily for deposit production"
rather than for helping to meet community

Other Deregulatory Efforts
A reduction has occurred in the activities of
many other economic regulatory agencies. In
1975, the Securities and Exchange Commission
ordered an end to fixed brokerage fees for
stock market transactions. In 1981, President
Reagan decontrolled crude-oil prices and petroleum allocations. Contrary to much contemporary criticism, the subsequent trend of energy
prices in the United States has been clearly
downward. The Bus Regulatory Reform Act of
· 1982 permitted bus companies to change routes
and fares.
In 1984, the Shipping Act enabled individual ocean shipping companies to offer lower
fares and better service than so-called
"shipping conferences" (really cartels). Also in
1984, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) eliminated rules that required TV
stations to keep public records of the shows
they air and to determine the programming
needs of the communities in which they operate. Thus far, the changes have mainly resulted in less paperwork, because most stations
provide more news and public affairs than the
FCC requires and fewer than the maximum of
commercials previously allowed.
In the telecommunications industry, the
government-forced breakup of AT&T has led
to a rationalization of rates. Charges for individual services now approximate more closely
the cost of service. The adjustments required
to meet competition have reduced subsidies for

16

17

credit needs. This provision runs counter to
the thrust toward national banking. It also perpetuates the myth pushed by CRA supporters
that banks should lend primarily in their localities. That runs counter to the desires of depositors who seek the highest risk-adjusted returns.
It is another example of trying to do good with
other people's money.

some consumers - particularly customers in
rural regions - while lowering rates substantially for users of long distance telephone service. In reducing the cross-subsidization bred
by regulation, the balance of benefit is surely
positive. The burst of competition in this hitherto closed industry has set in motion an unprecedented wave of technological innovation
which has produced a continuing expansion in
the variety of telecommunication services available to the public.
In one key area - the regulation of foreign
trade - some backsliding has occurred amidst
major progress. During the 1980s, the federal
government renewed or extended restrictions
on the import of automobiles, meat, motorcycles, sugar, steel, and textiles. With the end of
the Cold War, however, export controls on national security grounds have been eased substantially.
The congressional passage of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (N AFT A) is
an example of basically positive legislation with
a few serious shortcomings. The main thrust of
N AFT A advances regulatory reform by reducing trade and investment barriers between the
United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The
agreement, however, also contains stringent
"national origin" requirements in the case of
automobile imports. During the 1980s, this
restriction on open trade had failed to gain congressional approval on its own "merits." However, the overwhelming congressional approval
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) in late 1994 represents a major move
toward a more open world trading environment.

newer forms of social regulation have been on
the rise.
Reduced economic regulation ranging from outright deregulation to simplification and streamlining of rule making - has
enabled the competitive process to work better.
More people are traveling by air at lower real
costs. Depositors in financial institutions are
receiving higher returns on their money, as a
greater variety of companies compete for their
business. Long-distance telephone users are
finding that greater competition has resulted in
lower rates, while subsidies to local service
have been reduced.

A lack of concern with adverse economic
impacts has accompanied the most rapid
expansion in environmental and workplace
regulation in American history.

The reverse trend has been experienced in
the area of social regulation. A lack of concern
with adverse economic impacts has accompanied the most rapid and costly expansion in
environmental and workplace regulation in
American history.

Renewed Regulatory Expansion

Summary
It is evident that a considerable portion of
the traditional economic regulatory apparatus
has been cut back - at the same time that

On the basis of public reaction to developments in government during the 1980s, a different policy climate for business has taken
shape during the Clinton administration. It is
an external environment less hospitable than
that existing during the Reagan or Bush presidencies. This business climate is not a return
to the 1970s, when business was almost uni-

18
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formly portrayed as the villain and subjected to
a host of new government restrictions and
regulations. But it is a step away from the
relatively pro-business environment of the
1980s, to a more hostile or at least more ambivalent position.
Soon after becoming president in early
1993, Bill Clinton blasted "shocking" drug
prices. The President's top political strategist,
in discussing proposed changes in the health
care system, was quoted as saying, "Those who
get in your way, you try to run over by saying
they are putting their self-interest against the
25
national interest. "
This harsh talk was
quickly followed by tax increases on corporations generally and new limits on the tax deductibility of the compensation of chief executive officers.
Although the push to effectively nationalize
the health care system was derailed during the
last Congress, the Clinton administration has
tightened regulation in many other instances.
In the civil rights area an enforcement drive has
been enacted that will affect an array of industries nationwide. For example, banks are being
required to open more branches and make more
investments and subsidized loans in black
neighborhoods. Investigations of charges of
lending discrimination have dramatically increased.
One of the most controversial civil rights issues being pursued by the current administration is "environmental justice. " EPA has been
ordered to come up with a plan to protect poor
minority communities from an unfair share of
pollution. As is the case in many other regulatory areas, the very existence of an
"environmental justice" problem is a controversial issue. Several recent studies have questioned the research upon which the entire envi26
ronmental justice movement is based .
Researchers have not adequately analyzed the

population composition of an area prior to the
siting of an industrial plant or hazardous waste
facility. Often, major population changes have
occurred after the building was constructed.
Thus, reduced property values around a new
waste disposal site often encourage more lowincome - in many cases, minority - families
to move to the area after the facility becomes
operational.

Federal regulators are stepping up enforcement with a fervor that has not been seen since
the 1970s.
The head of the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), Joseph Dear, is moving forward with one of the
most ambitious regulatory agendas in the
agency's history. It includes an indoor-air
quality proposal that OSHA estimates would
27
cost $8 billion a year.
Mary Schapiro, the new head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC),
has promised to expand her agency's reach.
Repeal of the antifraud regulatory exemptions
for some hybrid commodity products and the
formulation of a policy on financial derivatives
are two of the initiatives she plans to adopt
during her tenure at the CFTC. She is quoted
as saying that industry can expect "a real dedication to enforcement, unlike any other chair28
man the agency has had. "
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is reviving its enforcement of resaleprice maintenance, an area of antitrust law that
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Federal regulators are stepping up
enforcement with a fervor that has not
been seen since the 1970s.

had seen no new cases since the 1970s. Scrutiny of vertical mergers between a manufacturer and distributor of the same product has
been revived. The division is hiring 25 new
lawyers, after adding 34 attorneys and 60
9
paralegals since mid-1992?

the discouraged employer. Most policymakers
and their advisers, however, ignore an obvious
symptom of this unfortunate situation: overtime is now at an all-time peak. Many employers pay the penalty rate of time-and-a-half for
overtime rather than hire an additional worker.
The reason all too often lies in government
regulation and mandates.

Reforming Government Regulation
Over the years, many efforts have been
made to improve the process of government
regulation.
However, virtually all of the
changes have focused on executive branch rulemaking. Truly reforming government regulation means far more than just revising the way
regulatory agencies carry out the tasks assigned
to them by Congress. In order to reduce the
very large and often avoidable economic burdens imposed by regulation, policymakers need
to focus on the birth stage of the rulemaking
process. The crucial action occurs, for example, when Congress enacts an 800-page Clean
Air Act with unrealistic timetables and an alNo
most endless array of requirements.
amount of Executive Branch analysis performed afterwards can deal with the problem.
It is up to Congress itself to weigh carefully
the benefits and costs before it enacts a regulatory statute and also to make sure that, if a new
law is required, its provisions are as costeffective as feasible. Congress should also examine the cumulative effects of government
regulation on the performance of the economic
system. The expansion of regulation in the
United States has passed the point of diminishing returns. Far too often, those returns are
negative.
In the past, economists have written about
the discouraged worker, who gives up the job
search in the belief that no suitable job opening
is available. We now have the phenomenon of
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Congress should carefully weigh benefits and
costs before it enacts a regulatory statute.

Small businesses provide the clearest examples of the discouraged employer. Companies
with a work force of 49 report that they avoid
hiring "number 50." If they did so, they would
become subject to the requirements of the affirmative action program and other federal
regulation. The health reforms proposed by the
Clinton administration in 1994 also would have
affected firms with 50 or more workers.

Comprehensive Approach Is Needed
With hundreds of regulatory statutes on the
book, it is not feasible to renew and revise each
of them. Instead, Congress should write one
new law which will reform regulation acrossthe-board. Five key provisions would be especially helpful:

1. A requirement for benefit-cost analysis in
each key stage of the regulat01y process
- from writing the statutes to issuing
regulations and reviewing the operation
of regulatory programs. Congress and
the regulatory agencies should avoid an
"at-any-cost" approach to achieving
23

regulatory goals. A zero-based review
of existing regulations is long overdue.

5. Congress should promote regulatory justice. Legislators and regulators should

2. When a statute requires cltLzens or organizations to obtain a permit, a fixed
timetable should force the agency to act
in a timely fashion. If the agency is not

avoid imposing costs on innocent parties.
Where regulation substantially reduces
property rights, compensation should be
paid.
Retroactively applying laws to
parties who met previous legal requirements should be avoided.

able to process an application by the
deadline, the permit should be granted
automatically. The private sector should
not be punished for the shortcomings of
the public sector.

3. Legislation should emphasize objectives
sought rather than precise methods to be
used for each regulatory program. Detailed laws that place "legislative handcuffs" on agency administrators prevent
more cost-effective solutions.
On the
other hand, legislators should avoid
writing laws so vague that they know in
advance that the courts will have to
wrestle with the details.
Congress
should also refrain from passing regulatory laws with requirements that they
know are not reasonably attainable. The
notion of wntmg laws that are
"technology-forcing" is wasteful of economic resources.

Conclusion
Now is an especially propitious time for
Congress to embark upon significant reform of
government regulation in the United States.
Such action would respond to the widespread
citizen dissatisfaction with the high cost and
limited benefits of many governmental activities.
Government decisionmakers overlook an
important fact when adopting new or expanded
regulatory requirements:
government intervention often does more harm than good. Policymakers should not ignore the tremendous
ability of individuals and private organizations
to deal with the shortcomings that inevitably
arise in a modern economy.

4. The federal government should use risk
assessment to help set priorities for
achieving greater protection of health,
safety and the environment in the most
cost-effective manner. All risks are not
equally serious. Government should focus on the most serious hazards. Sound
science and comparative risk analysis
should be drawn upon during the legislative drafting process. Regulating trivia
harms the society by diverting resources
away from more productive use.
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